We develop a framework for the analysis of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in computer networks. In this framework, we identify the components and resources that collectively and in time, construct a service that may become unavailable due to the unavailability of those resources as a result of a DoS. We also construct the notion of service resilience pre-ordering to compare the effectiveness of solutions proposed to improve a system's resilience against DoS. We apply our framework and methods to some cases, and show their usefulness and applicability in practice.
INTRODUCTION
Security in computer networks has three distinct aspects: information confidentiality, data integrity and service availability. Information confidentiality deals with unauthorized access to information; data integrity is concerned with unwarranted attempts to modify data, and service availability is the provision of a service during an expected time interval to a user who is authorized to request the same. A significant portion of earlier works on network security has been on information confidentiality and data integrity. Numerous cryptographic protocols have been proposed, which have resulted in a satisfactory level of confidence. However, effective and pragmatic solutions that would make a system more resilient to future unknown attacks on service availability have not yet been proposed.
Attacks on service availability are called Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Such attacks can be identified in three different categories: Resource Destruction (RD), Resource Preemption (RP) and Configuration Sabotage (CS) [1] .
In an RD attack, the attacker exclusively and completely keeps in use some of the system's resources for an infinite duration of time through only one transaction with the system. Terminating an RD attack would not result in the resumption of normal operation in the targeted system, and the network administrator must initiate appropriate corrective actions to bring the system back to normal operation. Corrective actions for this type of DoS are usually invasive, which may include shutting down and re-starting the system. In these attacks, the attacker utilizes some weaknesses or bugs in the operating or other system software in the targeted system to implement a scenario in which some necessary conditions for the correct execution of a service are not met. Ping of Death is an example of RD attacks [2] in which an attacker sends a ping packet with the size of 65,536 bytes or greater to a server. The server's CPU will then become completely busy to allocate a memory with a size greater than the predefined space for this service. Other examples are Teardrop and Land attacks in which the server is deceived to consider the received UDP packets with negative lengths when de-fragmenting them [3] . Another resource destruction attack that was reported in [4] uses UNIX FTP service for globbing commands.
In an RP attack, an adversary repeatedly preempts some of the required resources of a service in an accumulative manner, hence preventing other users from utilizing them. In this type, the attacker does not give enough time to the victim (the system under attack) to release the allocated resources, and so, after a number of iterations the resources are exhaustively allocated to the attacker's requests. Such attacks do not have lasting consequences in the sense that when the attack is terminated, the targeted system resumes its normal operation. SYN Flooding [5] , Smurf [6] and TFN2K [7] are a few examples of such attacks.
In a CS attack, an attacker intrudes the system and then alters or destroys some critical information. In contrast to RP and RD attacks, bringing the system back into normal operation may require extensive efforts by the network administrator to revert the damages done by the attacker. The CS attacks resemble the attacks on information confidentiality and data integrity. Therefore, in order to defeat these attacks, one may use the protocols and methods proposed to confront the attacks on information confidentiality and data integrity. Hence, in this paper, we exclude CS attacks from our analysis. An example of such attacks is DNS Spoofing [8] .
Some DoS attacks have multiple stages; each of which is an RD, an RP or a CS attack and may pave the way for another. Melissa [9] , Code Red Worm [10] and Nimda Worm [11] are some examples of such attacks.
We believe that effective solutions to DoS attacks can be devised through methodical analysis of system vulnerabilities to these attacks. In such an analysis, one can accurately identify the required elements in a possible solution.
Moreover, such an analysis can identify the reasons that contribute to the lethality of attacks, and would enable one to devise effective solutions. The need for methodical analysis is more evident in distributed systems where a large number of services are executed concurrently.
In this paper, we extend Millen's static model [12, 13] for the analysis of survivability to a dynamic model suitable for the analysis of the DoS problem. In doing so, we note that the availability of a service can be evaluated based on the availability of its resources. Availability of a resource is stated in time and considers the requests for the execution of services deploying that resource. Our proposed framework also includes a method for comparing the resilience of services against DoS attacks by way of resilience pre-ordering. Since each category of DoS attacks is different in nature, we construct a specific service resilience pre-ordering for each category.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we report on related works. In Section 3, we introduce our proposed framework. In Section 4, we provide a methodical treatment of the DoS problem. In Sections 5 and 6, we apply our proposed framework to some examples of RD and RP attacks, and show that our method can be readily applied to actual cases by providing several examples of attacks in each category. Finally, in Section 7, we present our conclusion and a summary of results.
RELATED WORKS
A number of frameworks or models have been proposed in the literature for the analysis of availability and DoS attacks. In [14] , Millen proposed the resource allocation model (RAM) in which he described the required resources for a successful execution of a computer program. He also stated the requirements that guarantee the availability of those resources to new requests for a service that needs those resources. He introduced eight rules to make a system resilient to DoS attacks. However, this model only considers the necessary conditions for resources and the relations among the resources and services according to a time policy, such as the maximum acceptable waiting time for provision of services. It does not, however, describe the effects of an attack on the resources. In addition, enforcing the proposed rules requires deployment of conventional access control policies in the system. Such policies may be detrimental, since an attacker can send numerous bogus messages and completely engage the victim's resources to verify the authenticity of these messages.
Leiwo and Zheng [15] extended Millen's RAM to propose a method for preventing DoS attacks. They suggested a DoS protection base (DPB) that consults with the resource allocation policy (RAP) and the resource allocation table (RAT) to determine whether a request made by a process, acting on behalf of a user, should be granted or denied. The RAP is constructed based on the waiting time policy (WTP) and the RAT that holds current information on the system resources. They also provided formal definitions for RAP, RAT, DPB and WTP. However, their model is static and cannot describe the relation between resources and processes in real time. Moreover, it cannot be used to accurately extract WTP and RAP, which may lead to wrong decisions in the DPB algorithm.
In [16, 17] , Meadows proposed a framework for the analysis of DoS attacks. In constructing this framework, she noted that at any time during a protocol execution where a victim mistakenly accepts a bogus message as a genuine one, an attacker can launch a DoS attack. She also categorized the way in which an attacker can initiate a DoS attack into two different scenarios. The main objective of Meadows' work was to establish a model to measure the costs of actions for an attacker and for a victim, and to determine the protocol's resilience against attacks using the measured costs. In order to do this, Meadows used the annotated Alice-and-Bob specification style and the concepts of failstop protocols. Conventionally, a protocol is fail-stop if any bogus message can be discerned, and the protocol halts upon detecting such a bogus message. To construct a conventional fail-stop protocol, a strong authentication procedure must be deployed. However, strong authentication is not suitable for the DoS problem, since it can lead to new DoS attacks. Hence, a variation of fail-stop protocols was proposed by Meadows in which the protocol halts upon realizing a special condition based on the cost function reaching a threshold during the protocol execution. One can use Meadows' framework to decide whether a protocol is resilient against a DoS or not, but the following weaknesses are noted in her approach. The framework was developed to analyze cryptographic protocols. In order to extend the framework to non-cryptographic protocols, some changes need to be applied to the framework. For example, instead of verifying the authenticity of a message, the proposed method should check for availability of resources in the targeted system. This resource check should be done with an appropriate cost for the victim so that an attacker cannot exploit it in launching a new DoS attack. Such amendments are particularly useful in the case of stand-alone attacks in which cryptographic messages are not exchanged, but where a virus destroys the system's resources internally. Furthermore, no method was proposed to construct the cost sets and cost functions, while the framework heavily depends on them.
Millen in [12, 13] defined a system as a collection of configurations, and each service as a class of a configuration partition. He also proposed a measure for survivability that is useful in comparing different services. For a service to be available, Millen requires that all supporting services of the corresponding configurations be available at the same time. However, one may encounter a situation in which a supporting service may be unavailable at the beginning of a service execution, but the service may, nevertheless, be executed successfully.
THE FRAMEWORK
Millen has proposed the following definition [13] . A system X is a set of configurations, together with a partitionX on X. The classes inX are called services, and if x ∈ X is a configuration of X, then a servicex ∈X is the service
containing the configuration x. Also, for x ∈ X, there is a set x ⊆X of services that supports x. The support function is irreflexive in the sense thatx / ∈ x. Configurations of the same service are irredundant with respect to support sets in the sense that, ifȳ =x and y ⊆ x, then y = x. The irredundancy condition implies that a system can only have two types of services: atomic and non-atomic. An atomic service has only one configuration with an empty support. Non-atomic services have multiple configurations each of which has a non-empty support. A non-atomic service is supported by an OR of its configurations, any one of which can be selected, while each configuration requires an AND of the services supporting it.
In Table 1 , we provide a list of notations used in this paper and their respective meanings.
Millen [13] has also introduced a hierarchical view of a system, in which each service is supported by its configurations or requires them. Similarly, a configuration is supported by its supporting services or requires them.
In order to introduce a dynamic, time-dependent notion of service availability, we divide non-atomic services in two categories, which for lack of better words are called concurrent, and compound services. Concurrent services are the same as the non-atomic services defined by Millen except for their availability. For a concurrent service to be available, the configuration of each of its atomic services should be available during a time interval (in contrast to an instance for the non-atomic services). From now on, we call the configuration of an atomic service its resource.
Compound services also have multiple configurations, each of which may have multiple supporting services. This type of service is supported by an OR of its configurations, any one of which can be selected.
However, each configuration requires a timed, sequential AND of the supporting services, in contrast to a static AND of the supporting services for a concurrent service. Hence, for a compound service, the supporting services for any one of its configurations do not need to be available simultaneously, but they should be available at their respective required times.
At a given time t, there exists a non-empty set of services, E t ⊆X, containing the services that are expected to be available at time t. In other words, they have to be provided if they are requested at time t. Each element of E t is called an expected service at time t. The instance t = 0 is the moment at which a system starts its operation. All services in a system may not be needed to be available continuously during a system run. The set of expected services specifies the services in a system that should be available at a specific moment with respect to the system start time. For example, when a service provider closes some incoming ports for any reason, including convenience, maintenance or prevention of a DoS, the services utilizing these ports are not expected services during that system run, while they may be expected in another run [18] .
Millen [13] has proposed the following definition for state. A set of configurations p ⊆ X is a state if for every x ∈ p, we have x ⊆p, wherep = {x|x ∈ p}. The state of a system at time t determines the available configurations at that time. In The set of all execution determinants for s I C The set of ordered pairs relating a resource in C to its available time interval
The function that assigns an execution time to each atomic service whose resource is in C S C The set of services whose supporting configurations are in C T C The function that assigns τ to each service in S C R Resilience pre-ordering for services against RP attacks traces(X, t) The set of traces in X till the moment t our proposed model, actions are performed through atomic services. As the execution of an action is time consuming, if an atomic service is expected at a moment, its resource should be available during a corresponding time interval. Therefore, ifx = {x} is an atomic service andx ∈ E t , there should be a time interval I = [t, t +α], α ≥ 0, so that for every τ ∈ I , we have x ∈ p τ , where p τ is the state of the system at time τ . We will also see that in a concurrent or in a compound service there should be a set of atomic services such that for each one, the corresponding resource has to be available during a specific closed time interval.
Consider the compound service s in Figure 1 . The label on a link connecting an atomic service to its resource indicates that the resource has to be available during that specific time interval. Suppose that the service s is expected at time t. In such a case, configuration c 11 has to be available during the time interval I 0 , configurations c 7 , c 8 and c 12 have to be available during the time interval I 1 , and configuration c 9 has to be available during the time interval I 2 . Therefore, for s ∈ E t the following conditions have to be satisfied:
Note that we have selected only one set of possible configurations for service s, and the conditions may be different if another set is selected.
The available time interval for a configuration c ∈ X in a service hierarchy is a closed time interval during which c is available. A resource is assumed to be available in a set of disjoint available time intervals. We will show that the available time intervals of the configurations of non-atomic services can be obtained from the available time intervals of resources in the hierarchy. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the hierarchy of a service terminates with the resources of its atomic services. A resource is a configuration that although it may have some components, but for convenience and from a macroscopic point of view, we consider it as stand-alone and without any component. However, from a microscopic point of view, a resource may have its own hierarchy, and may require the services and configurations in that hierarchy to be available at their respective required times. For a given service to be available, it is not necessary for all services and configurations in its hierarchy to be available continuously. Furthermore, their availability may be affected by the execution of services in the system.
In the hierarchy of a service s, we construct a sufficient substate for that service using the following procedure. We begin by selecting any one of its supporting configurations; there may be several services required for that configuration. For each of these required services, we select any one of the supporting configurations for that service. We continue this procedure until the supporting configurations for all atomic services (i.e. the resources) are selected. The set containing all selected configurations is called a sufficient substate for the service s. As an example, in Figure 1 In the above definition, the concept of 'required times' needs to be elaborated. We begin with a simple concurrent service in which atomic services are executed instantaneously, and the service at the top of the hierarchy is a concurrent one. We then consider the case for unrestricted concurrent and compound services in which atomic services are not executed instantaneously.
Simple concurrent service
Suppose that in the service hierarchy of the concurrent service s in Figure 2 , the available time intervals of the configurations of atomic services are known. Also, assume that atomic services are executed instantaneously. In such a case, services are available in the union of available time intervals of their supporting configurations, and the configurations are available in the intersection of intervals in which their supporting services are available. Therefore, the available time intervals of the configurations of non-atomic services in the hierarchy of s can be completely determined by knowing the available time intervals of the configurations of atomic services (i.e. the resources). A simple concurrent service s at the top of hierarchy is available at time t if there is a sufficient substate C, all elements of which are available at t. In such a case, we say that s is available through C at time t. Now, we establish the notion of service execution for a simple concurrent service. Suppose that a simple concurrent service s is available through C at time t. Assume further that s is requested at t as well. In such a case, the execution of s through C is represented by those requests for executions of the atomic services whose resources exist in C. concurrent service, each atomic service is provided at time t. In general, in a service execution through a sufficient substate C, a servicec, where c ∈ C, is provided at t if c is provided at t, and a configuration c ∈ C is provided at maxx ∈c tx ,C , where tx ,C is the time at which the servicex is provided in the execution of s through C. Hence, in the execution of s through C, the service s is provided at t.
A request for the execution of a simple concurrent service s through a sufficient substate C will be rejected (denied) if it is made when s is unavailable. Equivalently, such a request is granted if all resources in C are available when s is requested.
Unrestricted concurrent service
In this case, the service at the top of the hierarchy is a concurrent service, and the atomic services are not executed instantaneously. We assign a time interval to each service, during which the service can be provided. The service is called supported during this time interval. Note that provision of a service is a discrete event like a request for that service. In this regard, a service is 'available' when a request for that service can be satisfied during a time interval that corresponds to that request, and a service is 'supported' during an interval in which it is possible that a response event that provides the service can occur.
In Figure 3 , suppose that configuration c 0 is the supporting configuration of the atomic service s 0 , and s 0 is required by c. Also suppose that s 0 is requested at t 0 when its resource c 0 is available. Further assume that all services required by c, except for s 0 , are available at any time in [t 0 , ∞). The execution time of atomic service s 0 is defined by ET (s 0 ) = t 1 − t 0 if c is supported starting at t 1 . This means that the service s 0 is provided at t 1 .
We have already assigned an execution time to each atomic service (the collection of which would include all execution times for all non-atomic services associated with the concerned sufficient substate), and expect that a nonatomic service at the top of the hierarchy is provided at the moment its supporting configuration is provided. We assume that the atomic services in a selected sufficient substate begin to use their resources simultaneously at the moment the concurrent service at the top of the hierarchy is requested. Suppose that such a request is made when the resources in the sufficient substate are available. After the request is made, the supporting services of the requested service will be provided, starting from the bottom of hierarchy, and moving upward to the service at the top, where the service will be provided.
In the hierarchy of an unrestricted concurrent service s, assume that c 0 is a resource that is available in [α, β] . In such a case, the atomic service
A non-atomic service is available at t if any one of its configurations is available at t. A configuration of a non-atomic service is available at t if all of its supporting services are available at t. Hence, the unrestricted concurrent service s at the top of the hierarchy is available at t if there is a sufficient substate C so that each resource c 0 in C is available during [t, t + ET ({c 0 })]. In such a case, we say that s is available through C at time t.
The following example illustrates the timing details for a concurrent service where execution times are non-zero. In Figure 4 , assume that c 5 Figure 4 is equal to max(ET (s 1 ), ET (s 2 )). Suppose t 2 < t 1 , T 2 < T 1 , and ET (s 2 ) < ET (s 1 ). In such a case, the time interval during which s is available is
Suppose that the unrestricted concurrent s is available through C at time t. Assume further that s is also requested at t. In such a case, the execution of s through C is represented by requests for the execution of atomic services whose resources exist in C. Unlike the case of a simple concurrent service, atomic services in unrestricted concurrent services are not executed instantaneously. Therefore, if the atomic service s 0 = {c 0 } is requested at t, it is provided at t + ET (s 0 ). Moreover, during the execution of an unrestricted concurrent service through C, non-atomic services and their configurations are provided at specific times similar to those explained for a simple concurrent service.
In Figure 4 , if s is requested at any time t a ∈ [t 0 , t 0 + T 0 − ET (s 3 )], it will be provided at t b = t a + ET (s 3 + ET (s 1 ), t c + ET (s 2 ) ).
Compound service
For a compound service, the supporting services for its supporting configurations do not need to be available at the same time. In other words, when a compound service at the top of its hierarchy is requested, its supporting services may be requested subsequently, and not necessarily at the same time.
In order to describe the timed behavior of a compound service, associated with a sufficient substate C, we need to assign a T C (x) to each servicex, where x ∈ C, which represents the required time difference between that service request and a request for its immediate upper-level service in the hierarchy. The direct result is that if a configuration c ∈ C is required to be available at t, its supporting servicex ∈ c is required to be available at t + T C (x). Hence, in the hierarchy of a compound service associated with a sufficient substate C, an atomic service s 0 is available at t if its resource is available during [t, t + ET (s 0 )], a non-atomic service is available at t if its configuration is available at t, and a configuration of a non-atomic service, c ∈ C, is available at t if each supporting servicex ∈ c is available at t + T C (x).
For the compound service in Figure 5a , the required time differences are denoted by a tuple beside each configuration such that the nth element of the tuple represents the required time difference for the nth supporting service for that configuration when supporting services are numbered from left to right. Suppose that the tuple (τ 1 , 0) represents the required time differences for s 1 and s 2 . Suppose further that c 3 and c 4 are available during [t 1 , t 1 + T 1 ] and [t 2 , t 2 + T 2 ] respectively. As the required time difference for s 2 is zero, s 2 is requested instantaneously when the compound service at the top of the hierarchy is requested. In such a case, the service at the top of the hierarchy is available during
It is evident that a longer time difference τ 1 results in a longer interval during which the compound service is available.
Assume that a compound service s is available at t through a sufficient substate C. In such a case, the execution of s through C upon a request at t is represented by those requests for the atomic services whose resources exist in C. The time at which an atomic service s 0 is requested is t + CT s 0 , where CT s 0 is the sum of required time differences for services when we traverse the hierarchy of s in C upward, until we reach the compound service at the top of the hierarchy (for the service s at the top of the hierarchy, T C (s) = 0). Calculating provisioning times for services and configurations in the hierarchy of a compound service is the same as for an unrestricted concurrent service.
In Figure 5 , suppose that the compound service s is requested at t a ∈ [t 1 − τ 1 , t 2 + T 2 − ET (s 2 )]. In such a case, s 2 is requested at t a and provided at t a + ET (s 2 ), while s 1 is requested at t a + τ 1 and provided at t a + τ 1 + ET (s 1 ). Therefore, c 1 is provided at max(t a + ET (s 2 ), t a + τ 1 + ET (s 1 )) = t a + τ 1 + ET (s 1 ), and consequently s is provided at t a + τ 1 + ET (s 1 ).
In the hierarchy of a compound service, the required time differences are assumed to be fixed. This assumption is correct even if a service is requested after the provision of another one. In such cases, it is sufficient to assume that in a given hierarchy, if a service is requested after another service is provided, both are the supporting services for the same configuration. In Figure 5 , suppose that s 1 is requested after s 2 is provided. If s at the top of hierarchy is requested at t, then s 2 is requested at t and provided at t + ET (s 2 ). Therefore, s 1 is requested at t + ET (s 2 ), and it is sufficient to assign τ 1 = ET (s 2 ) to s 1 to represent the sequential executions of services in the hierarchy of s. When a service at the top of a hierarchy is executed iteratively (similar to a loop) it is regarded as a sequence of service executions. For example, if s in Figure 5 is executed n times, starting at t and subsequently after the provision of each of its predecessors, we can model these executions as the sequence of executions of s at times t, t + τ 1 + ET (s 1 ), t + 2(τ 1 + ET (s 1 )), · · · , t + (n − 1) (τ 1 + ET (s 1 )) .
Nevertheless, the required time differences assumed to be fixed in the proposed model cannot cover the case in which a configuration requires its supporting service to be available at least at an instance during a specific time interval. In other words, in order to develop a highly available service, it may be necessary to have varying required time differences (in contrast to the fixed required time differences), which would make it possible to postpone a request for a required atomic service when its resource is busy.
DENIAL OF SERVICE
In Section 3, we defined the availability of a service as the availability of certain configurations in a selected sufficient substate. In this section, we present a framework for the analysis of DoS, in which RP and RD attacks are considered separately.
Denial of service in a system happens when execution of some services requested by a user (or a group of users) results in a situation in which other requests for that service or some other services cannot be fulfilled. Such events may occur if the attacker initiates an attack with specific parameters at certain instances when the service is available.
Suppose that X is a system and s ∈X.
We define the execution determinant for s as a quintuple ED s = (C, I C , E C (.), T C (.), t). The service is requested at time t. The set C is the selected sufficient substate in the hierarchy of s. The set I C is the set of ordered pairs, each element of which contains a resource in C corresponding to an atomic service and the time interval during which that resource is available. The function E c : A C → R assigns the execution time to each atomic service in A C , where A C is the set of atomic services whose supporting configurations are in C.

The function T C : S C → R assigns a required time difference to each service in S C , where S C is the set of services whose supporting configurations exist in C. The time difference between the moments at which s is requested and provided is called the execution time of service s.
As an example, in Figure 4 , the elements of the execution determinant for a concurrent service s requested at time t c are C = {c 1 , c 3 , c 4 }, For the compound service s in Figure 5 , the elements of the execution determinant are similar to the above except for T C and t, which are T C = {(s, 0), (s 1 , τ 1 ), (s 2 , 0)} and t = t a .
The hierarchy of a service s in a selected sufficient substate consists of several paths from s at the top of hierarchy to the configurations at the bottom. Each path traverses several nonatomic services, several configurations and only one atomic service. Such a path is a service-configuration sequence that starts with s and terminates at a resource of an atomic service. We assign a cumulative required time difference to each service in such a sequence (path) as the sum of required time differences for the existing services in the path. The general form of such a path is w = (s, c, s 1 , c 1 , s 2 , . . . , s l w , c l w ) , where l w is the height of the tree representing the path. In this path, the cumulative required time difference for s i is
There may be different paths in a selected sufficient substate. For example, in Figure 1, 
Suppose that s is requested when it is available. Also, assume that ED s = (C, I C , E C (.), T C (.), t) and W is the set of all paths in C. In such a case, s is provided at t p = t + max w∈W ( 
. , k}. This implies that s is available during
it is requested at t / ∈ [t * a , t * * a ]. In Figure 1 , for the sufficient substate C = {c 1 , c 3 , c 6 
An atomic service in a system is commonly shared between various services in the same hierarchy or between services in different hierarchies. A service that the supporting services for its configurations are in use by other services may be denied. Atomic services can be shared by several services if constraints on their resources, such as their inherent limitations or unsuitability for parallel use, would not prevent this. When an atomic service is requested, it starts to use its resource during a time interval that depends on the type of service and the construct of that resource.
Consider the service 'memory_write' which writes a string into the memory and then protects it from overwrite. In the hierarchy of this service, there are three resources: the processor, the memory and the buffer, each of which corresponds to an atomic service. This service can use the same configurations and supporting services in order to write a 5-byte or a 10-byte string into the memory. The process mode can be either high speed or low speed. Therefore, we may have different services such as memory_write (5, low) and memory_write (10, high) . We do not differentiate between these services, and identify all of them as memory_write services whose execution parameters in execution determinant would indicate their differences. We define the parameterized execution determinant as a sextuple PD s = (C, I C , E C (.), T C (.), t, P ), where P is the sequence of parameters that determines the conditions under which s is executed. The service hierarchy cannot identify these conditions, as they specify the manner in which the resources are used by the corresponding services.
Consider again the service memory_write. Each atomic service in the hierarchy uses its corresponding resource and then releases it. The processor drives the data and the address on data and address buses and releases these buses when the write process is terminated, although the memory would still be in use even after the writing is terminated. We need to model the manner in which the resources are used by the corresponding services. A resource begins to be used at an instance its corresponding atomic service is requested. It will be in use during an interval whose duration is determined by that resource and its corresponding upper level services. Such an interval is obtained from the function U : R × PD * → TI, where R is the set of resources, PD * is the set of all parameterized execution determinants, and TI is the set of all time intervals in [0, ∞). The statement U(r, PD s ) = I 0 means that the resource r is in use during the time interval I 0 corresponding to the execution of s with the parameterized execution determinant PD s .
We consider the function cap : R → R that assigns a real number to each resource as its capacity. This real-valued function enables us to do algebraic operations easily. When a service is executed with a specific parameterized execution determinant, a portion of each resource is allocated to that execution in an interval determined by the function U . Such portions are determined by the function f : R × PD * → [0, 1], where R is the set of resources, and PD * is the set of all parameterized execution determinants. Therefore, the allocated fraction of a resource r for the execution of a service s with parameterized execution determinant PD s is f (r, PD s )cap(r). If an atomic service whose resource r is used by 1/f (r, PD s ) services at any given moment, then a new request for that service with parameterized execution determinant PD s will be denied as the resource r is not available at that moment.
We define the execution model for a system as a quadruple E = (PD  *  , U (., .), cap(.), f (., .) ), where PD * is the set of all parameterized execution determinants of the services in the system, U is the function that determines the interval during which a resource in a parameterized execution determinant is in use by its respective atomic service, cap is the function that determines the capacity of each resource, (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD k ) .
The way in which the resources are kept in use may be different for various DoSs. We categorize DoSs as RP and RD depending on how the resources are used. We refer to all expected services in a time interval I by E I , i.e. E I = ∪ t∈I E t , where E t is the set of expected services at time t. Also, we refer to all parameterized execution determinants of a service s and the mth element of PD by PD * s and PD m respectively. Furthermore, D * is the set of all DoSs in the system and ED * s is the set of all execution determinants for a service s.
We use our framework to define the RP and the RD DoSs. 
. . . , PD k ) is a DoS in a system whose execution model is E = (PD * , U (., .), cap(.), f (., .)).
Now, D is an RP DoS if there is a resource r in the system such that (a) ∩
A careful examination of the above definitions leads us to some key features of RP and RD DoSs. First, an RP DoS repeatedly uses some resources of the system, gradually reduces their available portions, and finally makes them unavailable for the services that need them. Hence, the limited resources of a system are vulnerable against such DoSs. Second, a sequence of service executions, and not just one service execution, is required for an RP DoS. This is not the case for an RD DoS. Third, while a particular set of parameters in the service parameterized execution determinant may result in an RD DoS, there exists another set of parameters that would not result in an RD DoS. For a service s, there exists a set of parameter sequences, none of which would result in resource destruction DoS in the execution of s. This set is called the set of correct parameters for s. 
servicex ∈X is called isolated if it does not have any interaction with the environment of X. An Attacker is a subsystem of the system environment.
RESOURCE DESTRUCTION
Assume I = [t 0 , t 1 ] is a time interval and A a is the set of available services during a subset of I in the attacker system. Also, suppose that A v is the set of available services in the target (victim) system during the interval I . An attacker initiates an RD attack by executing a sequence of existing services in A a , so that some of them interact with the victim's system resulting in an unconformable execution of one service in A v (destruction of a resource in the system).
The attacker requests a service from the victim by a sequence of parameters that does not exist in the set of correct parameters. In an isolated system, which does not interact with the environment containing attackers at any time, it is reasonable to assume that services are executed without causing resource destruction. As stated earlier, an unconformable service execution is identified solely from the values of parameters in the parameterized execution determinant of that service. Proof. Part (c) in the definition of RD in Section 4 implies that the reason for RD is the execution of a service with certain values of the sequence of parameters in its parameterized execution determinant. If the services are isolated, they have no interaction with the environment. Therefore, from Axiom 5.1 there would not be any RD in the system and the system is fully resilient against RD attacks. If the set of correct parameters for each service s ∈X contains all possible sequences of parameters for that service, then ∀s ∈X, ∀ED ∈ ED * s , ∀P ∈ P * s [(ED ∧ P ) / ∈ D * ], where P * s is the set of all possible sequences of parameters for the execution of s. Thus, the system is fully resilient against RD attacks.
Proposition 5.1 can be used to design systems that are more resilient against RD attacks. In order to do so, we expand the set of correct parameters for services that interact with the environment. The modified service s m is more resilient than s (which is substituted by s m ) if CP s (ED) ⊂ CP s m (ED m 
t then s m ∈ E t and vice versa (both are expected at the same time). We say s m is more resilient than s against RD DoSs, denoted by
, where T is the set containing the times at which s and s m are expected to be available.
As an example, consider the Teardrop attack. This attack exploits weaknesses in the reassembly of IP packet fragments. During its journey through the network, an IP packet may be broken up into smaller chunks. Each fragment looks like the original IP packet except that it contains an offset field that says, for instance, 'This fragment is carrying bytes 600 through 800 of the original (non-fragmented) IP packet'. The Teardrop attack creates a series of IP fragments with overlapping offset fields. When these fragments are reassembled at the destination, the system may crash, hang or reboot [3] .
We consider Teardrop as an RD DoS in which D = (PD reassembly ), where PD reassembly is the parameterized execution determinant of reassembly service. If PD reassembly = ED reassembly ∧ P , then P / ∈ CP reassembly (ED reassembly ). In other words, the attacker causes an unconformable execution of the reassembly service in the victim's system. Suppose that a sequence of parameters for the reassembly service is in the form of an ordered pair (., .), the first element of which is the offset length for the received packet, and the second element is the starting byte number in this packet. In such a case, the set of correct parameters would be of the form CP reassembly = {(len, start)|0 < len < 65536, 0 < start}. The processor is one of the resources in the hierarchy of 'reassembly'. If the service is executed with parameterized execution determinant PD such that PD 6 / ∈ CP reassembly , then conditions (a) and (b) stated in the definition of RD DoS in Section 4, i.e. ∃t d < ∞ [U(processor, PD) = (t d , ∞)], and ∃s ∈ E U(processor,PD) ,
Now, consider the modified service 'm_reassembly' which is the same as the reassembly service except that a service 'check' has been added into its hierarchy. Before the execution of memory allocation, the service 'check' evaluates the parameters of the requested service. If the sequence of parameters is not in the set of correct parameters, memory allocation is executed and allocates 0 bytes of the memory, which means that a request for the service that would have resulted in an RD DoS is in effect thrown out. Therefore, Teardrop does not cause RD in this system. Figure 6 compares the hierarchies for the services 'reassembly' and 'm_reassembly'. The m_reassembly service has a new set of correct parameters CP m_reassembly = {(len,start)|len,start ∈ Z}, where Z is the set of all integers. Therefore, CP reassembly ⊆ CP m_reassembly , and consequently reassembly ≺ RD m_reassembly.
RESOURCE PREEMPTION
As stated earlier, the resources of a system may be shared by different services. Thus, an arbitrary sequence of services may face shortages of resources, and hence only specific sequences of services whose properties are explained below can be executed during any given time interval.
Suppose that all resources of the system X are completely free (no portion of them is in use) at time 0. We denote the traces set of the system till the moment t 0 by traces(X, t 0 ), defined as the set of possible sequences of parameterized execution determinants representing possible sequences of service executions. These services are requested during
We use the parameterized execution determinants PD defined in Section 4, and assume that (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD n ) ∈ traces(X, t 0 ). This sequence contains n PDs representing a possible sequence of service executions during [0, t 0 ] so that PD 1 5 ≤ PD 2 5 ≤ · · · ≤ PD n 5 . We also assume that R i is the set of resources in r, we construct the set of indices J r = {i|r ∈ R i } for the services that require r. Now, we can examine the existence of the sequence (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD n , PD n+1 ) in traces(X, t 0 ). 
Proof. Assume that for a resource r ∈ R n+1 the condition (a) is held. From the definition of traces, the resources are initially available. Moreover, as (a) indicates, the sequence of service executions (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD n ) does not affect the availability of r when the atomic service s r = {r} requires r. As this is the case for all resources in R n+1 , the service execution PD n+1 can be fulfilled. Similarly, if the condition (b) is held for a resource r ∈ R n+1 , then that resource is available when it is required by s r = {r}. In other words, after a sequence of service executions (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD n ), resource r is still available for the service execution represented by PD n+1 . Therefore, a service execution with the parameterized execution determinant PD n+1 can be realized. Conversely, if (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD n , PD n+1 ) ∈ traces(X, t 0 ), then it is evident that either (a) or (b) is satisfied for each resource r ∈ R n+1 .
From the above, we conclude that from a possible sequence of parameterized execution determinants such as S = (PD 1 , PD 2 , . . . , PD n ), we can identify all possible sequences pre-pended by S, and then extract traces(X, t 0 ). Furthermore, each sub-sequence of the elements of traces(X, t 0 ) is also an element of traces(X, t 0 ).
Suppose that E t 0 is the set of expected services at t 0 and s ∈ E t 0 . In such a case, s is resilient against RP DoSs if ∀tr ∈ traces(X,
If this condition is not satisfied, then there is a sequence of parameterized execution determinants tr ∈ traces(X, t 0 ) that results in an RP DoS. We construct a resilience pre-ordering to compare the resilience of services against RP DoSs. Consider V s,t 0 = {tr ∈ traces(X, t 0 )|∀PD ∈ PD * s [ PD 5 = t 0 ⇒ tr ∧ PD / ∈ traces(X, t 0 )]} and assume that for each instance t, if s ∈ E t then s m ∈ E t and vice versa (both services are expected to be available at the same time As an example, consider the SYN Flooding attack [5] . This attack uses existing flaws in TCP/IP protocol suite by exploiting the transport layer vulnerabilities. Sending data from a source to a destination requires establishing a connection between them by executing connreq. The process of establishing a connection (i.e. the execution of connreq) involves three steps. First, the source sends a SYN packet to the destination. Then, the destination sends an ACK packet for the received SYN to the source. Finally, the source sends an ACK to the destination. After receiving SYN, the destination allocates a block of memory containing the connection information. This allocation lasts for a period of time. After receiving the ACK in the third step, the allocated memory is released. Prior to the end of the third step, the connection is MA ) is T 0 . If a request for establishing a connection with the server is sent to the server at t 0 , and t 0 + CT MEM−atomic ∈ V , then the request is rejected and the requested service, connreq, is denied (CT MEM−atomic is the cumulative required time difference for the atomic service that requires MEM as its supporting configuration). The set V connreq,t 0 consists of the sequences prepended by (PD (1) 
connreq is the parameterized execution determinant for connreq so that
A more resilient service is denoted by 'm_connreq' in which V m_connreq,t ⊆ V connreq,t can be constructed if (PD (1) connreq , PD (2) connreq , . . . , PD (K) connreq ) / ∈ V m_connreq,t . To achieve this, one may increase the capacity of the resource MEM. A limited increase results in (PD (1) connreq , PD (2) connreq , . . . , PD (Q) connreq ) ∈ V m_connreq , where Q > K, and so the new service is also vulnerable to RP DoS. However, the provision of a modified service, spaced in time by means of adjustable cryptographic protocols such as the one proposed in [19, 20] is more resilient than the original service, but not completely resilient, to RP DoS attacks. This is not the case for RD attacks, where by extending the set of correct parameters one can construct a fully resilient service. This is due to the different natures of RD and RP DoS attacks. In an RD attack, services are executed in an unconformable manner that can be characterized by a set of parameters in a parameterized execution determinant. The server can check such parameters and adopt appropriate preventive actions. However, in an RP attack, hostile executions of services cannot be easily identified. Hence, even the most effective countermeasures to RP attacks, proposed and analyzed in [21] , are not either totally effective or result in creating constraints to normal users as well as to attackers.
Another example of RP attacks is Smurf [6] . ) may constitute an RP attack on l i . Furthermore, the incoming echo requests collectively use the processing facilities of the server. Suppose that r is a resource of the server with a finite capacity ω that represents the entire processing facilities at the server. One can utilize the functions f (r, PD process ) and U(r, PD process ) to examine the Smurf attack in the same way that we analyzed the SYN Flooding attack earlier in this paper.
In the following example, we show that our proposed framework can be used to show the effects of service reconfiguration on service availability. By reconfiguration, we mean changing the hierarchy of a service or modifying the required time differences T C introduced in Section 4. Suppose that F T represents the File Transfer service so that F T = {c}, c = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s K }, and s k is an atomic service (i.e. s k = {r k }) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Assume that the only vulnerable resource to RP attacks is the outgoing link, denoted by r ol , in the sense that other resources are available in the expected time intervals (and for simplicity, at all times). In the hierarchy of F T as shown in Figure 7a , the only upper level service for a given s k is F T , and hence CT k = T C (s k ) = τ k . This means that if F T is requested at t, then s k is requested at t + τ k and requires its resource, say r k , during [t + τ k , t + τ k + ET (s k )]. From our assumptions, we know that all resources except for r ol are available at all times and an RP attack can only preempt r ol . Therefore, F T is available at t iff r ol is available during [t + τ ol , t + τ ol + ET (s ol )].
In order to construct a more resilient F T service, we propose either (a) to reconfigure F T in such a way that the atomic service s ol is not requested at a specific instance (determined by the request time of F T ), but at any instance during a time interval assigned to s ol , or (b) to reconfigure F T in such a way that the execution time of s ol becomes shorter.
For (b), we split s ol into a number of atomic services, the execution times of which are shorter than the former. For example, the file can be divided into packets, and each atomic service would transfer one packet. If we combine (a) with (b), we would have a more effective reconfiguration.
This means that we split a file into smaller portions each sent independently. This requires the resource in shorter time intervals in a non-overlapping manner. Figure 7c shows this new service F T com−recfgd . Now, we consider (a) again. As shown in Figure 7b , the required time difference for s ol can be in [τ ol , τ ol + η], where η is an arbitrary time (in contrast to the original service in Figure 7a in which the required time difference for s ol is fixed to τ ol ). If F T recfgd is requested at t, it is provided at t * ∈ [t + τ ol + ET (s ol ), t + τ ol + η + ET (s ol )], where τ 0 = 0. Therefore, the execution time of F T recfgd is between t +τ ol +ET (s ol ) and t +τ ol +η+ET (s ol ) . Thus, a new DoS attack can be formed through which an attacker preempts r ol to increase the execution time of F T recfgd . This type of DoS attack is called the Denial of Quality of Service (DoQoS) and results in a low quality of services in a system.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended Millen's static model for the analysis of survivability into a dynamic model suitable for the analysis of DoS attacks. We proposed definitions for the DoS, RD DoS and RP DoS.
We demonstrated that our framework can be used to devise appropriate modifications to a service for improving its resilience against RD and RP DoSs. We also constructed the notion of resilience preordering that can be utilized to compare the resilience of services against RD and RP attacks. We showed that it is possible to reduce the vulnerabilities of the system against RD DoSs. However, improving resilience of services against RP DoSs seems to be a dilemmatic problem. This is a challenging area for future research.
The main limitation of our proposed model is that in a compound service we have assumed fixed required time differences for the request of supporting services. This assumption suffices a large number of services; however, there are some systems in which the supporting services are permitted to be postponed in order to improve their availability when the resources are busy. The fixed required time differences are not appropriate for such cases and the model needs to be extended. Moreover, in a complicated system, especially for the attacks having multiple stages, verifying real time availability of services is not a simple task and should be done by means of an automatic checker. Developing such a checker could also be a topic for future research.
